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First session of the EURATOM/Canada negotiations 
1. Introduction 
The first session of the Euratom/Canada negotiations was 
held in Brussels on the 28 and 29 April 1983. 
The Canadian delegation Wd~ led by Mr Don CA~~BELL, deputy 
under-secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ; 
the Community delegation was led by Mr Jos LOEFF, deputy 
Director general in DG I ; Mr c. AUDLAND, Director general 
of DG. XVII also took part. 
As a basis for discussion, the Commission put forward a draft 
exchange of letters (see Annex)a 
This first session enabled both parties to outline their 
respective positions. With regard to retransfers and security 
of supply, the Canadian and Community positions are, as expected, 
far apart. The Community delegation emphasised the need for 
a certain flexibility in the Canadian position in order for the 
agreement to form a stable and foreseable framework for the 
Community's supply (and for its relations with Canada). 
In general the Canadians agreed that an exchange of letters was 
the appropriate form for modifying and updating certain aspects 
of the agreement, without formally changing the 1959 textc 
2Duration of the Agreement 
The Canadian delegation agreed in rv·: '"'',.. · ~ .• 1::' l.Ommunity 
proposal (a 20 year extension), but stated that the adoption 
of a definite position on this question depended on the form of 
the solutions agreed upon for the other questions under discussion 
and in particular the questions related to security of supply. 
I 
3. Retransfers 
The Community delegation emphasised the need to arrive at a 
more flexible system than the one foreseen in the 1959 agree-
ment and explained the proposals put forward in the draft 
exchange of letters which are based on the "London Guidelines". 
2. 
The Canadians stated that their policy in this field went beyond 
the London Guidelines. It consisted of authorising retransfers 
only to ~hose countries with which Canada has concluded bilateral 
agreements. (To date these countries are : us, Japan, South 
Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, Euratom (10 countries), Finland, 
Sweden, Egypt, Roumania, Australia ; moreover, negotiations are 
currently taking place with Spain, Mexico, Yougoslavia and 
Switzerland.) 
The "concession" that they could make to the Commission would be 
to foresee an automatic retransfer mechanism, without authorisa-
tion, to all these countries. All nuclear materials, including 
plutonium, would benefit from this system. Moreover, if it is 
foreseen in the bilateral agreement concluded with the receiving 
country,the retreatment would also be allowed in that country 
without authorisation (to date, the only agreements which provide 
for such conditions are those with Euratom and Japan). 
Furthermore, for those materials which are not on the "trigger list", 
the Canadians are prepared to consider more flexible conditions 
for their retransfer. 
The Community delegation underlined the restrictive nature of 
the Canadian policy. It declared that the impossibility of 
retransfering materials of Canadian origin to a country with no 
bilateral agreement with Canada had not been,to its knowledge, 
the subject of an official publication or· ~ublic statement of the 
Canadian government. If this Wl'l"' "'-~ .: ~ _,.w~, Lne Commission would 
welcome the appropriate references. The Canadian delegation took 




The Community delegation also emphasised that the Community's 
nuclear industry which transforms nuclear materials of Canadian 
origin, exports on a world-wide basis. The list of third coun-
tries with wnich Canada has an interest in concluding bilateral 
agreements does not necessarily correspond to that of third 
countries to which European industry has an interest in expor-
ting materials transformed in the Community and under conditions 
in which the receiving third countries would give the same 
assurances to the Community as those given by the latter to 
Canada for the original transfer. 
In support of this reque£+ by the Community, +he fact that Canada had 
recently recognised, in the framework of the It:.P. Board of Governors, 
the need to remove trade obstacles in the energy field 
in the OECD/IEA zone,was brought to the attention of the Canadian 
de Legation. 
In conclusion, the Community delegation requested that the Canadians 
provide more precise information on their policy (whether public 
or not) regarding retransfers and suggest practical solution arising 
from this. On its side, the Community delegation would provide 
the Canadians with a list of countries to which the Community 
could be interested in retransfering materials. 
4. Security of Supplies 
The Canadian reactions to the Community's proposals were particularly 
reserved. They stated that they could not guarantee that there 
would be no changes to their non-proliferation policy, and, if there 
were, that these changes would not apply to materials to be supplied 
with respect to contracts already concluded. For the Canadians there 
is a strong link between this question and the duration of the 
agreement. In the current situation whereby the agreement can be 
denounced with six months notice, they r,,. rl possibly ~•ccept our 
proposals ; however if the duration of the aqrppm~-+ we~ fixed at 
twenty years, they could not commit themselves to authorising the 
delivery of materials as a result of contracts already concluded • 
. I. 
4. 
In effect, as the contracts in question are often of long duration, 
this could result in deliveries being continued for periods of up 
to 10 or 15 years without conforming to any eventual new non-
proliferation policy. 
The Community delegation strongly underlined the insatisfactory 
nature of the Canadian position regarding security of supply. In 
effect, the "annual review panel", which each year, on the basis 
of a series of criteria (1),grants export licences for the coming 
year for nuclear materials,as a result of contracts which have 
been or will be concluded, could, at any moment in time, refuse 
to grant these licences ;~particular in ca~~s where the transfer 
conditions of the amended Euratom/Canada agreement no longer 
correspond to an eventual new Cana:liannon-prolif2ration policy. 
In these conditions t~e Euratom/Canada agreement would be limited 
to outlining the transfer conditions which would only be valid 
until Canada unilaterally dec~Jes otherwise. 
At the risk of loosing all credibility, there should be no 
possibility of modifying an international agreement on long term 
energy programmes without the agreement of both parties. 
Equally, if the agreement were modified in this way, it would be 
normal that the conditions would not be retroactive, that is to say 
they would not apply to materials which have been or will be 
supplied as a result of concluded contracts (Art. XVIII and Side 
letter n° 1 of the Euratom/Australia agreement). 
The Canadian delegation was not clear on the extent to which an 
international agreement, such as that between Euratom and Canada, 
could be unilaterally modified by a "domestic law" or a simple 
(1) The Canadians mentioned four criteria a) non-proliferation 
..JJ ·Domestic law" 
c) Price 
d) priority for the 
Canadian transformation industry under competitive conditions • 
. I. 
' \ I 
change of policy. This uncertainty was undoubtely voluntary, 
having understood how unacceptable it would be to the 
Community to adopt a system whereby an international agreement 
could at any moment in time be unilaterally questioned. 
The Canadians stated that they would further reflect on the 
objections and proposals of the Community and that they might 
subsequently submit new proposals. 
5. Researc~ and Development 
s. 
The Canadians would be ready to accept the Community's proposals 
on Article 2 of the Agreement but they consi,'ered that in this 
case it would be advisable to slightly modify Article 1 in 
order to establish a Legal framework which was sufficiently broad 
so as to include cooperation activitiPs in various R&D ftelds 
on which both parties could eventually agree. 
The Canadian delegation will propose the appropriate wording 
on this question. The Commission took note of this intention. 
6. General Remarks 
The Canadians asked whether the Community considered that the 
current Agreement still included the application of safeguards 
on equipment of Canadian origin and for what reason there was 
no reference to this in the exchange of Letters. The Community 
delegation replied in the affirmative, explaining that the 
exchange of Letters was primarily concerned with those aspects 
, I 
of the agreement which have currently a real practical application. 




DRAFT EXCHANGE OF LETTERS 
BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN ATOf'1IC ENERGY COrt.MUNITY (EURATOM) 
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA 
(hereafter : letter from the Community to Canada) 
Your Excellrncy, 
I refer to the Agreement betw~en the Government of Canada and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) for cooperation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy signed on 6 October 1959 (hereinafter 
referred to as the Aqreement). 
The Agreement, and in particular 1ts provisions related to nuclear 
safeguards, were subsequently updated, at the request of the Government 
of Canada, throuqh two exchanges of letters between the Parties, whir.h 
took place on 16 January 1978 and on 18 December 1981. 
It now seems necessary to complete tHe up-dating of the AgrPement to the 
extent necessary for it to continue to provirle a stable and predictable 
legal framework for the relations between the Parties and, in particular, 
.. for nuclear supply from Canada to the Community. 
To this end, I propose that the Aqreement be updated and completed as 
follows 
(a) Pursuant to article XV.2 of the Aqreement, after the initial period 
of ten years, which ·expired on November 17, 19n9, either Party can 
terminate the Agreement at any time, subject to six months notice. 
In ·'rder to 
provide a stable framework for nuclear cooperation between Canaod 
and the Community~ the Parties agree that the A~reement shall remain 




Cb> Pursuant to article IX.1 of the Agreement, nuclear material and 
equipment supplied under the A~reement, and nuclear material derived 
from the use of such material and eQuipment, cannot be transferred 
from the recipient Party to a third country, except with the prior 
consent of the supplier Party. 
The Parties consider that it is desirable to seek appropriate 
procedures to implement that clause in such a way that, without 
prejurlice to safeguards' reQuirements and to Canada's non-proliferatior 
policy, industrial real~ties and the needs of international trade 
be taken into account. 
Since, in practice, retransfers occur only in relation to Canadian-
origin material supplied to the Community, the Parties agree that t~e 
following procedures shall apply to such retransfers : 
CO retransfers of huclea· materials not includ~ in the "trigger 
list" referred to in the "Guidelines for nuclear transfers" 
CIAEA 'document INFCIRC/254) may take place subject to a 
.. 
prompt notification from the Community to Canada of each such 
retransfer; 
(ii) retransfers of nuclear maierials included in the afore-
mentioned "trigger list", except heavy water and weapons-
usable materials, may take place subject to a prompt notifi-
cation from the Community to Canada of each such retransfer, 
includinq a confirmation that the recipient thTd country ha~ 
provided the sam~ assurances as those reQuired by Canada 
for the original transfer; 
Ciii> retransfers 9f heavy water or weapons-usable materials 
referred to in the aforementioned "triq~er list" shall be 
jointly considered by the Parties and subject to Canada's 
prior consent on a case-by-case ~2sis. 
(c) The Parties consider that it is desirable to seek appropriate means 
to reconcile the requirements of Canada's non-proliferation 




To this ~nd, the Parties agree that, whenever supply contracts 
are concluded in compliance with the provisions of the existing 
Agreement, deliveries of uranium to the Community pursuant to such 
contracts shall not be delayed or interrupted by refusal of an 
export licence. 
The Parties also agree that no future amendment or revision of the 
provisions of the Agreement shall be applicable to nuclear material 
suppliP.d or to be supplied pursuant to contracts entered into before 
the introduction of such amendment or revision, unless Canada and 
the Community so agret. 
Further, the Parties agree that, witl a view to facilitating nuclear, 
transfers, they shall consult at the request of either Party and 
without delay, on questions related eo stability and regularity 
of nuclear supply. 
(d) Article II of the Agreement, "without limiting the generality of 
' Article I", singled out a partic!Jlar area of cooperation, viz. a 
joint R & D programme connected with the natural uranium-fuelled, 
heavy water-moderated type of nyclear reactor. 
Pursuant to that Article, the Parties concluded in 1959 a technical 
a9reement aimed at est·ablishing a joint R & D pro~arnmc centered c·n 
such reactors. This agreement, which had been extended in 1965, 
.expired in 1968, as a consequence of a re-orientation of the Com-
' . mun1ty R & D programme. 
Since 1959, major 
developments have been recorded in most areas of nuclear R & D. 
In particular, the type of nuclear reactors referred to in Article II 
have now reached industrial maturity. As a consequence, the Parties 
take note that the R & D programme r~·r ided for in Article 11 has 









If the foregoing is acceptable to the ~overnment of Canada, I have 
the ho~our .to propose that thi~ile~ter· ·which. is authentic in the Danish, 
Dut eh, English, French, German/' Greek a ne;! It e,L ian languages, together 
with Your Excellency's reply to that etfe.ct shall· constitute an amendment 
to the Aqreement and shall enter into force on the date of Your Excellency's 
reply. 

